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WHY THE BRITISH CONCEPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
WAS THE MAIN REASON FOR BREXIT – AND WHY THE 
BRITISH ‘LEAVE-VOTE’ MAY END UP SAVING RATHER 
THAN UNDERMINING THE EU 
 
 
Marlene Wind 
 
“There's only one degree of freshness — the first, which makes it also the last”  
― Mikhail Bulgakov 
 
Abstract 
Doomsdays preachers suggested that Brexit and Trump would mean the end of the liberal world order 
as we know it and thus the end of the EU. The research presented here suggests the opposite. Not 
only have Europeans turned their back to populism by voting yes to reforms and pro-EU-parties and 
governments in different member states over the past months, but Brexit and Trump also seems to 
have given a complete new momentum to the European project. This article demonstrates why Brexit 
cannot be generalized to the rest of the continent but is the result of a complicated and special British 
conception of what it means to be a sovereign state in the 21st century. Moreover and paradoxically, 
surveys show that the greatest fear among Europeans today is not more European integration but right 
wing populism and European Disunion. 
Keywords: Brexit, sovereignty, UK, EU, Euroscepticism, Populism 
 
“The decision made by Britain to leave the EU and the political and economic consequences that 
will follow have made a measurable impact for citizens of other member states: their support of the 
European Union has grown”1. 
                                                 
* Professor and Director of the Center for European Politics at the Department of Political Science of the University of 
Copenhagen, as well as Professor at iCourts (the Center of Excellence for International Courts) at the Faculty of Law of 
the University of Copenhagen. The author would like to thank Regitze Helene Fredreriksen and Emil Bønding 
Wichmann for research assistance for this contribution. I would also like to thank my colleagues at iCourts (the Center 
of Excellence for International Courts) at the Faculty of Law of the University of Copenhagen for commenting on a 
previous draft and Federico Fabbrini for many helpful suggestions. This paper was originally presented at the 
conference “Law and Politics of Brexit” at Dublin City University, on 20-21 April 2017 and will appear in a revised 
form in Federico Fabbrini (ed), “The Law & Politics of Brexit” (Oxford University Press, 2017). 
1 Bertelsmann Stiftung www.bertelmann-stiftung.de report from 21.11 2017.  
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1. Introduction 
Foreign Affairs recently published an article with the title ‘The reverse Domino Effect’2. The article 
suggested that after the Dutch elections in March 2017, but also the election of van der Bellen in 
Austria in December 2016 and Rajoy in Spain in June 2016, all the doomsdays preachers after Brexit 
and Trump were proven wrong and that Europe would now say goodbye to populism. After the 
landslide election of Emmanuel Macron (66%) over Marine Le Pen (33%) on the May 7th presidential 
election this hypothesis by Foreign Affairs seem further confirmed. In fact, we may now go as far as 
saying that because of Brexit and Trump Europeans are now waking up and reacting against 
populism’s easy answers to complicated questions. Or is this all wishful thinking? This chapter will 
try to ask what we can learn from Brexit and whether the UK’s goodbye to the EU is likely to be 
emulated in other European countries in the near future. Is the EU falling apart or was the UK 
relationship with Europe so special that the domino thesis predicted by many after the Brexit-vote 
and the election of Donald Trump in the US must be rejected? This chapter argues and seeks to 
demonstrate that Brexit most likely will be a unique endeavour. As it is dangerous to predict about 
the future this will also not be attempted here. However, it will be suggested that the UK’s historical 
past, uneasy relationship with Europe and in particular its obsession with sovereignty is and always 
has been special compared to most other member states and that it may have influenced the decision 
to leave the EU and to hold a referendum in the first place. It is important here to emphasize that this 
chapter/article does not represent a thorough analysis of the UK’s decision to leave or to hold a 
referendum. It is also not an in depth comparison between the UK and other European countries. 
Rather it looks at some specific but – I will argue – important traits and central issues related to the 
‘domino’ thesis presented by scholars and commentators after Brexit and the election of Trump. Apart 
from a look at the special British situation the chapter will thus focus on the result of the national 
elections in Europe following Brexit and Trump where populism and anti-European sentiments were 
expected to take hold. It will also use important opinion polls from European countries in the 
aftermath of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as an indicator of the domino-effect predicting 
an undermining of liberal institutions like the EU. 
The chapter/article is structured in four parts. The first part discusses whether populism is an 
unstoppable global and European trend and argues that no – it is a very crude narrative proposed by 
the media and certain commentators. Little in the data we have collected here suggests that populism 
                                                 
2 Pierpaolo Barbieri, “Europe’s Reverse Domino Effect: No One is Following Britain out of the EU” Foreign Affairs, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2017-03-16/europes-reverse-domino-effect?cid=int-
now&pgtype=hpg®ion=br2  
 
 5 
 
is a coherent unstoppable wave that is taking all liberal institutions down. The second part argues that 
the British uneasy relationship with the EU has always been different and that their type of anti-
Europeanism is of a sort that we do not find in most other European countries. What is scrutinized 
most in depth here is the British conception of sovereignty which was at the core not only of the 
‘leave campaign’ but also in Theresa May’s emphasis on ‘taking back control of our own laws’ and 
escaping the European Court of Justice. The third part looks closely at the opinion polls in other 
European countries. Here it is documented that dissatisfaction with the establishment, with political 
elites and globalization and the EU plays out differently in different European countries.  The fourth 
part, finally, concludes and summarizes the findings.  
 
2. Populism: an irreversible trend? 
The big question in many EU capitals but certainly also in Brussels after the British decision to leave 
the EU in the referendum of June 23, 2016 was exactly whether other countries would follow suit.3 
Would Brexit trigger an implosion by EU sceptic voters in other member states demanding a similar 
vote? Would others – infused by the populism of the leave campaign and the exit-strategy of the May 
government, but also by the victory of Donald Trump on the other side of the Atlantic - want to follow 
in the British foot-steps and free themselves from the so-called Brussels bureaucracy, the 
Luxembourg court, transnational regulators and the world-leading single market? 
This chapter argues that this is a very unlikely outcome. If we look at the available polls it even seems 
as if Europe has been strengthened by Brexit and Trump. , after the very clear pro-Europe win by 
Emmanuel Macron as president of France. Moreover, the doomsday predictions result at least in part 
from a limited appreciation of the unique character of the British relationship with Europe and its 
special conception of sovereignty, combined with an understandable collective chock and media-
hype. One of the more noticeable warnings was made by Polish-American historian Anne Appelbaum 
in Washington Post in April 2016: ‘Is this the end of the West as we know it?’ suggesting that if 
Brexit happens, Trump is elected and Le Pen becomes the next French President, the West will no 
longer constitute the same liberal order we used to know4. In April 2016, former EP President and 
                                                 
3 See Frexit, Nexit or Oexit? Who will be next to leave the EU? This brief article discusses the possibilities that Brexit 
will happen in either; the Netherlands, France, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Germany or Denmark. It includes however 
limited data on the support for such a referendum and the public support for the EU itself. Most countries are viewed to 
be unlikely to issue a referendum. Reference: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/27/frexit-nexit-or-oexit-
who-will-be-next-to-leave-the-eu 
4 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/donald-trump-and-the-end-of-nato/2016/03/04/e8c4b9ca-e146-11e5-8d98-
4b3d9215ade1_story.html?utm_term=.2d7afaee1b2b 
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now German chancellor candidate Martin Schulz also warned that Brexit might trigger an implosion5 
Much less sophisticated doomsday stories than the one presented by Appelbaum and Schultz came 
from US observers in high numbers.6  
Now that British Prime Minister Theresa May has handed over the divorce papers to European 
Council President Donald Tusk in Brussels the British and American Press are no less “…full of 
alarm and excitement.”7 It is of course understandable that many broadcasters see the Brexit-
negotiations as an opportunity to speculate about the spread of the ‘Brexit-disease’.  
However, as the Dutch parliamentary vote in March 2017 – together with the Austrian Presidential 
election in December 2016 and the very pro-European Macron win in May 2017 - have demonstrated 
the likelihood that one can easily deduce from Brexit and Trump the ‘fall of Europe’ seems very 
superficial to say the least. While the agony with Europe and established parties and elites cannot of 
course be denied, political dynamics clearly play out differently in different countries. In fact, polls 
show that Le Pen has not even herself benefitted from Brexit – not even in the short term. She landed 
on 21% in the first round – much lower than expected. As Lafitte and Mcshane put it, this is even less 
than what the French Communist party (with very similar ideas of protectionism) received in the 
1950s and 60s.8 In the second round she landed on 34% which – even though her party’s best result 
ever – was far from what was predicted by pollsters and experts on populism. However, it would 
probably still be dangerous to entirely discharge Le Pen and National Front if he does not succeed 
with his overall reform program during the next 5 years.  
Even though it is difficult at this stage to list the exact causes of the reactions to Brexit and Trump 
among ordinary Europeans, we can - as we are to see below - detect a certain reinvigoration of the 
European project in many European countries. Many of the recent polls thus show a steady and 
increasing support for Europe - a support which rose markedly right after the British people voted to 
leave the EU in June 2016. Whether other European countries will follow the UK with their own 
referenda in the coming years will probably in part depend on the final outcome of the Brexit 
negotiations and the deal that the UK eventually gets. If the outcome were to be too beneficial for the 
                                                 
5 Cited from Z HYPERLINK “http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/europaeische-union/martin-schulz-sieht-bedrohung-
durch-europafeindliche-bewegungen-14173019.html”  
6 See e.g. The National Interest, “Europe Will Implode”, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-eu-will-likely-implode-
15314; Just like during the financial crisis where many American analysts and media people saw the end of not only the 
Eurozone but the EU as such, Brexit and Trump will now result in a meltdown of all liberal institutions – at least so it is 
predicted However, as with the Eurozone where as Foreign Affairs puts it: “…a Spanish bailout came and went; a new 
Italian government restored confidence, as did European Central Bank President Mario Draghi” 6 who pledged that he 
wanted to do ‘whatever it takes’ to save the euro. Things did in other words not end as predicted in the newsrooms. 
7 See www.politico.eu/article/why-marine-le-pen-wont-win-trump-brexit/  
8 www.politico.eu/article/why-marine-le-pen-wont-win-trump-brexit/ 
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UK - getting access to the single market but with fewer strings attached than what is the case under 
the current EU rules, this could animate anti EU- movements in other European countries to campaign 
for a similar exit route for their countries. Influential EU-sceptic parties in Denmark have thus 
explicitly announced that they will demand a referendum if the deal that the UK gets is more 
favourable to the UK than expected and thus to the one Norway already has. Nevertheless, at this 
stage the likelihood that the UK will be able to obtain a good deal seems rather limited, which suggests 
that it is unlikely that other  EU member states will seek to follow the same path. 
 
3. Why the UK is special 
It is hardly controversial to say that the UK is exceptional when it comes to its rather schizophrenic 
approach to the EU9. Moreover, defining British opposition to the EU as part of a British 
exceptionalism makes it possible to examine this specialness more thoroughly. For the British people, 
the EU has represented different possibilities. For some the EU was a promise of peace and stability, 
for others the Single Market’s promise of jobs and prosperity was at the centre of attention. However, 
as pointed out by Leonard , none of these readings or possibilities seems seductive enough anymore.10 
The British people today understand the EU both as a heavy bureaucratic machinery and as the cause 
behind many of the negative changes in their society, like migration, rising housing costs, and 
inequality. A vote for Brexit moreover was for some also a way to reinvigorate the past British 
‘Grandeur’ – with the UK becoming an economic powerhouse by itself. Thus, the opposition is deeper 
than just structural or institutional factors, which is highlighted by the more pragmatic and utilitarian 
approaches to the EU.11  
The UK first applied to join the Common Market in 1963 but membership was vetoed by the French 
President Charles de Gaulle. In 1973, Britain – together with Denmark and Ireland - was finally 
admitted into European Economic Community (EEC) under Conservative Prime Minister Edward 
Heath. As opposed to Denmark, the British government did not let a referendum decide whether to 
enter the EEC. Instead in 1975 – after having entered - it held a referendum asking: ‘Do you think the 
UK should stay in the European Community (Common Market)?’ The referendum divided the Harold 
Wilson Labour government while the public endorsed membership with a huge margin. 67% voted 
to stay in. The result of the referendum was characterised by Wilson as a ‘historic decision.’12 The 
                                                 
9 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/16/leave-or-remain-in-the-eu-the-arguments-for-and-against-brexit/  
10 Leonard (2016) Europe seen from the outside – the British view, European Council on Foreign Relations. 
11 Glencross (2016) Why the UK voted for Brexit, Palgrave Studies, p 7f 
12 Source 
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referendum framed the EU as a ‘business arrangement’ – in the wording of James Callaghan - and 
played into the utilitarian idea, that pooling sovereignty with other European states should be based 
on a calculation of the cost and benefits of doing so. Glencross argues that British Euroscepticism is 
born out of concerns about the costs in relation to both core principles of European integration and 
moves towards a greater political union. Thus, British opposition to the EU project, as catalysed only 
2 years after joining the Union, can be understood as a utilitarian question as to whether the UK really 
needed to be part of the project. The same attitude reoccurred over the years and can for sure also be 
found in the 2016 referendum, here premised on the belief, that the UK could quit the project, because 
it now has higher cost than benefits, with no deleterious consequences.13  
In sum, whether the 1975 referendum was historic or not, fighting Brussels already began shortly 
after the 1975 referendum and in 1984, at a summit in Fontainbleau, the UK obtained its famous 
‘rebate’ from the EEC, after Margaret Thatcher threatened not to pay into the EU budget.14 As 
Thatcher put it: ‘We are not asking the Community or anyone else for money. We are simply asking 
to have our own money back.’15 
The UK was at the time the third poorest member of the Community but ended up becoming the 
biggest net contributor to the EU budget. This was mainly because the UK had relatively little 
agriculture and thus a rather small share of farm subsidies, which at the time made up more than 70% 
of the EU budget.  
In 1993, John Major had problems selling the Maastricht Treaty to his own back-benchers. The Treaty 
was voted down at a referendum in Denmark in 1992 resulting in the so-called Edinburgh-agreement 
where Denmark was given permanent opt-outs on 1) the euro; 2) defence; 3) Union citizenship – an 
opt-out that was later deleted as it was no longer relevant16 and 4) supranational cooperation in the 
Justice and Home Affairs area.17 Based on these opt-outs Denmark, in a second referendum in 1993 
approved the Maastricht Treaty. UK Prime Minister John Major did not call a referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty but ended up opting out of the single currency and the treaty’s ‘social chapter’. 
Later when Tony Blair took over as Prime Minister in 1997 the UK moved closer to Europe. Speaking 
to the European Parliament in 2005, in fact, Blair wore the cloths of a passionate pro-European 
                                                 
13 Glencross (2016) pp 8-9 
14 Begg & Heinemann, New budget, old dilemmas, Centre for European Reform, 
http://83.143.248.39/faculty/didar/EUR324/briefing_new_budget_22Feb06.pdf 
15 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4721307.stm 
16 The reason why it was no longer relevant was that Denmark had only refused to accept Union citizenship if it were to 
replace national citizenship. In the Amsterdam Treaty some years later, it was written into the Treaty that Union 
citizenship was only a supplement and not a replacement of national citizenship. 
17 For an in-depth analysis of the Danish (and British) opt-outs see R. Adler-Nissen (2015) Opting Out of Europe, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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claiming that it wanted the UK to be in ‘the heart of Europe’. 
However, in 2005 The Dutch and the French voted the European constitution down and when its 
replacement, the Lisbon Treaty was finally adopted in 2009, the new British Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown did not show up for the ceremony. Brown moreover got famous for avoiding meetings in 
Brussels altogether when he could18. 
The agony over Europe within the conservative party grew even more serious under Prime Minister 
David Cameron and he promised already when elected in 201019 to ‘bring back powers from 
Brussels’. After Cameron came to power several polls made it clear, that it was in particular British 
conservative voters were escaping the Tories and were more attracted to the new anti-EU party UKIP 
(UK independence Party), which had become famous for their leader Nigel Farage and his hard 
rhetoric against the EU.  
Therefore, on January 23 2011 Prime Minister Cameron delivered a major speech on Europe where 
he promised his voters and the British people to renegotiate the UK’s EU membership. He also 
presented the UK Parliament for the EU Act 2011, which set a legal requirement for a referendum in 
case of any future EU treaty reform20. In 2014 Cameron, before the upcoming general election, held 
yet another speech saying that EU migration was one of the biggest problems of EU membership, 
combined with the migrants’ access to the British welfare benefit system. He also said that he would 
‘rule nothing out’ (including leaving the EU) if his attempt to ‘get a better deal for Britain’ from his 
EU collaborators did not work. In the EP election in 2014 UKIP was very successful and won 24 out 
of 73 seats (26,77% of the votes, with an increase of 11 mandates)21 setting Europe firmly back on 
the British agenda. To the surprise of many Cameron came out of the 2015 general election much 
stronger than expected and with a promise to take back power from Brussels through a new deal.  
The repeated promise of an EU referendum throughout the British history rests on two concerns. First, 
that the EU membership was too restrictive for the UK, here perceived as a more free-trade and 
                                                 
18 Tony Barber reporting for the Financial Times: “The UK prime minister's appearance at an EU summit of heads of 
state and government tomorrow will be his first visit to Brussels since he succeeded Tony Blair in June - a lengthy 
absence that has not gone unnoticed at the European Commission and among EU national embassies. Britain at the 
moment is more detached from the EU than at any time since the mid-1980s," says an experienced western European 
ambassador, referring to the years when Margaret Thatcher, as UK premier, adopted a famously abrasive stance on 
Europe”.  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/697be030-a91e-11dc-ad9e-
0000779fd2ac.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4hEbwFMmQ 
19 Election results found at: www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-
referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/uk-general-elections/2010-uk-general-election-results 
20 See Paul Craig in this volume and his: ”The EU Act: Locks, Limits and Legality” Common Market Law Review” 
21 Election results found at: www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-uk-2014.html and 
http://www.bbc.com/news/events/vote2014/eu-uk-results 
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globally oriented player. And second, that the membership lacked popular support. This feeds back 
to the utilitarian attitude, but also to a narrative, framed by UKIP, that the British people never got 
what they voted for back in 1975. A common argument within the Eurosceptical camp was that the 
EU had developed beyond the control of the UK and especially the British people.22 It was however 
also a narrative about the EU or ‘Brussels taking decisions’ on its own - decisions that fundamentally 
contradicted British interests and that the British delegates mostly voted against. While this 
description was hardly true, it became the one that won in the British tabloids. Cameron was moreover 
good at playing this game in front of the national press presenting his ‘victories’ in Brussels as some 
he had won against all odds. The concessions that Cameron finally got from its EU partners when 
negotiating ‘a new deal’ in February 2016 were thus a hard sell. At the same time, the migrant crisis 
just after the Eurozone crisis did not contribute to make the EU look better in the eyes of the British 
public. In February 2016 a referendum on Britain's membership was eventually announced to be held 
on June 23rd the same year. After a fierce campaign for and mainly against Europe, the ‘leavers’ won 
the referendum by 51,9 % against 48.1% for remain. A YouGov study23 from 23-24 of June 2016 
revealed a generational divide.  
Table 1 Yougov exitpoll on the British referendum June 24 2016 
 
                                                 
22 Glencross (2016) pp 10ff 
23 https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/oxmidrr5wh/EUFinalCall_Reweighted.pdf 
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Citizens aging 50 years and up were in large majority in favour of leaving the EU. The younger 
generations largely voted ‘remain’. Education also played a role as 63% of the people with a “low 
attention to politics” voted ‘leave’ and 62% of the people in the lowest income group voted ‘leave’. 
 
4. Taking back control or ‟The Allure of Sovereignity” 
“The UK has long been shorn of its empire; now it will be shorn of Europe, too” 
In her Lancaster House speech24 but also during the leave campaign (of which Theresa May did not 
take part as she herself recommended to vote ‘remain’) two central elements were recurring. The first 
was to ‘to take back control’ of migration. Not asylum seekers and refugees – who had hardly surfaced 
as a problem during the debate but rather EU migrants. The second was the wish to escape the CJEU 
jurisdiction and to ‘write and judge on our own laws’, as May put it in her speech. So we are in other 
words talking about the ‘reclamation of British sovereignty from technocrats in Brussels’25. Or in 
Farage own words: ‘Britain should reassert itself as a proud, patriotic country that has control of its 
borders, represents itself on the world stage and makes its own law in our own sovereign 
parliament.”26 
In her Lancaster House speech May launched also a rather nostalgic vision of the UK as a new 
dominant player on the global stage – dominating the Commonwealth which, according to Isahaan 
Tharoor, some anonymous government officials even labelled ‘Empire 2.0”. As Tom Whyman27 puts 
it: 
“Brexit is rooted in imperial nostalgia and myths of British exceptionalism, coming up as 
they have — especially since 2008 — against the reality that Britain is no longer a major 
world power”. 
Moreover, a YouGov Eurotrack Survey28 showed in February 2017 that most Brits think the EU needs 
the UK at least as much as the UK needs the EU. 33% of the Britons here believe the EU needs Britain 
more than Britain needs the EU, 28% believe that they need each other equally. The data displays, 
that Britons probably see themselves as a more important actor internationally than they maybe are 
                                                 
24 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/17/theresa-mays-brexit-speech-full/ 
25 Isahaan Tahroon, Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/31/brexit-and-
britains-delusions-of-empire/?utm_term=.ad5dbeff2103  
26 https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2014/10/15/1000-words-parliamentary-sovereignty/  
27 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/opinion/theresa-mays-empire-of-the-mind.html?_r=0 
28 February 8th, 2017. Fieldwork done: 19th - 24th January 2017 See 
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/di1fktb0k8/January_Eurotrack_W.pdf 
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(in contrast to the other countries view of them).  
Looking at May’s speech but also at the ‘vote leave’ campaign – not to mention the debate going on 
(for years) in the UK on leaving the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)29 – the 
sovereignty issue is central. As argued by current British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson “you 
cannot express the sovereignty of parliament and accept the 1972 European Communities Act.”30 As 
it is well known, EU law prevails over domestic law in cases of conflict. In the UK the principle of 
the supremacy of EU law over national law was established in Factortame in 1991, when a British 
parliamentary act on ship registration was set aside by the CJEU after complaints by Spanish 
fishermen.31  
The question of sovereignty has however haunted the British EU debate for decades if not centuries.32 
What parliamentary sovereignty implies, in its most conventional understanding, is as pointed out by 
Dicey: ‘Parliament can make whatever laws it wishes; that no ‘higher’ constitutional laws or 
principles constrain Parliaments legislative authority; and that other institutions, including the courts, 
must accept as valid laws duly enacted by Parliament.’33 According to this view the fact that for 
instance the UK parliament respects fundamental rights is due not to a written constitution or 
supranational courts or conventions, but simply to a deliberate political choice made by parliament 
itself. This echoes Richard Bellamy’s34 definition of ‘political constitutionalism’ in opposition to 
‘legal constitutionalism’ where the parliament is seen as limited by either a constitution, the courts 
(supranational or national) or international conventions. 
According to Elliot the UK is fairly alone in this conception of sovereignty in the EU. Most countries 
after the Second World War adopted forms of legal constitutionalism (instead of political 
constitutionalism). Or to use Ronald Dworkins version of the same typology: ‘constitutional’ as 
opposed to ‘majoritarian democracy’ which emphasises the sovereign majority in parliament as 
elevated above other balancing powers including the courts35. That the UK should be entirely alone 
                                                 
29 See J. Christoffersen & M. Rask Madsen (2011), The European Court of Human Rights between law and politics, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
30 Boris Johnson cited in Mark Elliot, Brexit: Vote leave, take control? Sovereignty and the Brexit debate 
https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/06/23/vote-leave-take-control-sovereignty-and-the-brexit-debate/ 
31 Case Factortame 1991 C-221/89. 
32 http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21695056-talk-taking-back-power-may-be-delusional-more-democracy-not-
dreaming-sovereignty 
33 Originally by A.v. Dicey, “The Law of the Constitution” 1885, here cited in Mark Elliot: 
https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2014/10/15/1000-words-parliamentary-sovereignty/ See also R. Bellamy (2007), 
Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defense of the Constitutionality of Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
34 Op.cit. 
35 R. Dworkin 1996, Freedoms Law: The moral Reading of the American Constitution, Harvard University Press.  
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is however not quite true, as a similar conception of sovereignty, democracy and the role of Parliament 
can be found among the Scandinavian countries as I have demonstrated in much of my recent 
writings.36 In Denmark, Sweden and Finland (but to a much lesser extent Norway), unlimited 
majoritarian democracy for centuries trumped any conception of constitutionalism. In Scandinavia 
there was  either no tradition for practicing judicial review at the national level or this was directly 
forbidden in the national constitutions until the beginning of the 2000s. As I have explained elsewhere 
these anti-court sentiments are still strong and have produced a reluctance towards supranational 
courts which is similar to that of the UK. In particular in Denmark and Sweden the aversion against 
European constitutionalism has been so manifest, that only very few cases have been referred to the 
ECJ,37 and the ECJ case law is very rarely cited by these countries highest courts.38 The UK is thus 
not alone in its ambivalent relationship to the ECJ (or the European Court of Human Rights for that 
matter). Countries based on majoritarian democracy will always find it hard to merge into a political 
system like the European one based on constitutional rather than majoritarian principles.  
The question, however, is whether ‘unconstrained’ majoritarian democracy is a very useful guide in 
a globalized world where sovereignty increasingly is something you pool rather than retain? In other 
words, do you become more rather than less sovereign by leaving the EU? You may think more. Yet, 
being outside the EU with no influence on the rules that will limit and structure any states 
manoeuvring in a 21st century global society will most likely make you much less sovereign. This is 
in fact confirmed by the UK government project of a “Great Repeal bill”.39 As the government white 
paper make clear, the bill will simply copy-paste EU law into UK law. Moreover, if the UK wants to 
continue trading with the EU in the future it will largely have to live up to and implement the exact 
same standards in effect today among the EU member states. Regardless of the details of the 
withdrawal deal, the UK remain heavily dependent on the rules and regulations of one of the world’s 
                                                 
36 Who is Afraid of European Constitutionalism? The Nordic Distress with Judicial Review and Constitutional 
Democracy, published in Nomos Verlag, 2015, in Claudio Franzius, Franz C. Mayer, and Jürgen Neyer (eds.), Modelle 
des Parlamentarismus im 21. Jahrhundert. Neue Ordnungen von Recht und Politik; Recht und Politik in der 
Europäschen Union, Band 4 iCourts Working Paper Series, No. 13 see free download at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2539045http://cep.polsci.ku.dk/pdf/iCourts_Working_Paper_Serie
s__No._13.pdf; see also M. Wind (2009), When Parliament comes first – The Danish Concept of Democracy meets the 
European Union, Nordic Journal of Human Rights, vol 27, no 2: 272-288. 
37 M. Wind (2010), The Nordic Reluctance Towards Supranational Judicial Review, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol 48, no.4:1039-1063; See also Wind et al, (2009), The Uneven Legal Push for Europe, European Union 
Politics, vol. 10 no. 1: 63-88. 
38 M. Wind, (2016), Do Scandinavians Care about International Law?, Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 85: 
281-302. 
40 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-great-repeal-bill-white-paper The Government's white paper on the 
Repeal Bill has no exact figures for the number of EU rules which will be transferred into domestic law. However, it 
does note that there are currently more than 12,000 EU regulations in force. The White Paper adds that Parliament has 
passed 7,900 statutory instruments implementing EU legislation and 186 Acts which incorporate a degree of EU 
influence.  
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largest market - just like the Norwegians and the Swiss are. The British people may ‘believe’ that 
they are more sovereign than regular EU members by focusing merely on the formal rules but in 
reality they end up being much less sovereign than if they had remained a member exercising 
influence on its own future laws and regulations.40 As McBide argues41 – the UK when discussing to 
leave the EU had to decide about continuing to be a ‘rule maker’ or – if quitting – become merely a 
‘rule taker’. The essential question was whether the UK wanted to continue being either inside 
influencing the law-making or turn into a ‘rule taker’, following those rules that the EU has made and 
which will shape the future42. As pointed out in an analysis on sovereignty and the Brexit debate in 
The Economist:  
“Many talk of being sovereign as if it were like being pregnant: one either is or is not. 
The truth is more complex. A country can be wholly sovereign yet have little influence. 
Britain has signed some 700 international treaties that impinge on sovereignty. Although 
the EU has the biggest impact, others count a lot: membership of NATO, for example, 
creates an obligation to go to war if another member country is attacked. It can be worth 
ceding this independence to gain influence”. 
Apparently however, the understanding of what it means to be sovereign in the 21st century, and what 
it means to leave a collaboration like the EU based on the pooling of sovereignty hardly influenced 
the Brexit debate prior to the referendum. The question is now whether other EU member states may 
embark on a similar journey as the UK - launching referenda on the EU and eventually leave. We 
saw above that in particular Denmark and other Scandinavian nations look at sovereignty and 
democracy very much in the same way as the UK does. Denmark entered the EU at the same time of 
the UK and has had a very pragmatic relationship to the EU.43 However, Denmark has not – so far at 
least - drawn the same consequences from its majoritarian outlook. It may very well come down to 
the fact that Denmark is and perceives itself as a small open economy fundamentally dependent on a 
larger market to survive. The Danes surely love their ‘perceived’ sovereignty as well and still do not 
like either judicial review or supranational courts setting aside their national parliamentary laws. 
However, as things looks now overall pro-European sentiments have increased in Denmark after 
                                                 
40 J. Fossum & E. O. Eriksen (2014), Det norske paradoks: Om Norges forhold til Den europeiske union, Oslo: , 
Universitetsforlaget. The book ‘The Norwegian paradox’ deals with the impact of Norway's EU accession for 
democracy and asks if it affects the preconditions for constitutional democracy? 
41 J. McBide, (2017), The Debate over Brexit’, Council of Foreign Relations, www. 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/196540/The%20Debate%20Over%20%27Brexit%27%20-
%20Council%20on%20Foreign%20Relations.pdf   
42 K. Schaldemose (2017), Sovereignty in the 21st Century, Masters Thesis, Department of Political Science, University 
of Copenhagen. 
43 Kelstrup, M, D. Martinsen & M. Wind (2017), Europa i forandring, Copanhagen: Reitzel [Europe under 
transformation: a book on the EU’s political and legal system]. 
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Brexit. Certainly things may not stay that way and much will probably depend on the quality of the 
deal that the UK ends up getting with the EU, but polls show that so far the Danes stick to what they 
know and what they got. Let’s now take a closer look at the surveys and results we have managed to 
collect so far. The general picture is also here that the UK is much more sceptical towards the EU 
construct than any of the other European Member States. 
 
5. Will other countries follow the UK out? No so likely…. 
‘Should I stay or should I go now?’ asked the Clash back in 1982. ‘Stay’ is certainly the answer if we 
look at public opinion polls and surveys from the months following the Brexit referendum. Two 
important insights can be taken home from the preliminary data, polls and surveys we have collected. 
Firstly, populism and attitudes towards Europe and European integration have different roots and 
causes in different EU member states: According to the data, therefore, it is not possible to detect a 
general aligned anti-establishment or populist trend. Secondly, data reveal that also after the 
activation of art.50 there continues to be a great split in attitude towards Europe between the UK and 
the continent.  
After Brexit there were however as indicated earlier a lot of discussion on who would follow next. 
Even people in the new Trump administration saw Brexit and the UK’s goodbye to the EU as the first 
sign of a genuine European split: “According to different media rapports the first question asked by 
the new Trump administration to European officials in Brussels was: “who will leave next”44. 
It is in this light rather interesting to take a look at the first European surveys after the Brexit-vote. 
They may thus be able to tell us a little about where the attitudes in Europe are moving. The first 
survey we have consulted is the YouGov European Mega Survey from August-September 2016.45 
This Survey, conducted right after the Brexit vote, confirmed that Britain is a special case when it 
comes to the public’s approval of EU membership. The majority of the respondents in the other 
Member States have a much higher approval rating of their EU membership than UK respondents.  
In another segment, being asked about EU immigration, the distribution shows however that France 
also has a large number of people seeing immigration from other EU countries as a bad thing. The 
other countries score lower. Moreover, being asked if it is likely that their country will leave the EU, 
of all countries other than Britain only 1/5 say that they believe their country will be next. The 
                                                 
44 Foreign Affairs ibid. 
45 Fieldwork YouGov done: 31st August - 9th September 2016 
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YouGov dataset goes into detail with a lot of EU countries on some central issues. Relevant for our 
research here however is the overview of whether the populations would vote ‘remain’ or ‘leave’ if 
an ‘exit’ referendum where to be held. 
Table 2 Yougov survey; fieldwork done post-Brexit 31st August - 9th September 2016 
 
The data above shows that in August 2016 – after the ‘real’ referendum - 45% of the Britons would 
vote to leave the EU, which is slightly higher than the percentage (43%) who would remain. In 
contrast the populations of the Netherlands, Denmark, France and Germany would all vote to stay in 
the EU, with confident margin. 
 Netherlands GB Germany France Italy DK 
Strongly 
approve or 
approve 56 % 41 % 59% 54 % 54 % 61 % 
Strongly 
disapprove 
or 
disapprove 30 % 46% 26% 34 % 35 % 29 % 
Don’t know 14 % 14% 15% 12 % 12 % 10% 
 
A study with similar results comes from the Bertelsmann Stiftung.46 The data here shows that since 
Britain voted to leave the EU, there have been signs of a more positive approach in other countries to 
the EU. This is something that might be explained by the many uncertainties surrounding the UK 
                                                 
46 Reference: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/topics/aktuelle-meldungen/2016/november/brexit-boosts-eu-
survey-results/ 
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situation after the referendum. It thus suggests as we also will get back to below when analysing the 
national elections held in other European countries in 2017 that Brexit may in fact have had the 
opposite effect than expected by the domino theory and taken some of the air out of the populist 
movements in Europe. 
To put it differently not much of the data we have had the opportunity to look at supports the 
doomsdayers’ prediction that other EU member states will put Europe on the ballot not to mention 
leave the EU in the near future. If we look at data from the Pew Institute we learn that “Populism is 
not a coherent transatlantic trend.”47 It is moreover underlined that the populism that can be detected 
is a much more plural movement with local roots48. Both in the US and EU it may be anti-
establishment and anti-globalisation, but the things that really matter are by large peoples own 
national problems. And these differ. So what this study concludes is that populism needs to be 
understood in the context of each country. This may sound self-evident but does never the less counter 
those many post-Brexit (and Trump) narratives who foresaw a uniform flood of disenchanted voters 
overhauling and crushing not only the political establishment but all liberal institutions. 
Let us therefore take a closer look at some of the elections in Europe in 2016-2017 – what did they 
in fact show us?  
The first national election, which could have given an indication of whether a general populist trend 
was emerging and were foreseen with great anxiety by the rest of the EU, was the Presidential election 
in Austria December 2016. In that election the choice was between the green candidate Van der Bellen 
and the right-wing nationalist leader of Austrian Freedom Party FPO Nobert Hofer. Hofer was at first 
a highly supported Presidential candidate receiving 35% of the vote in the first round as opposed to 
only 21% of his rival the ‘Green’ Alexander Van der Bellen. In the second round of voting however 
Van der Bellen came out as the winner (49.7%/50.3%) but the election was annulled by Constitutional 
Court due to voting irregularities. In the re-run on 4 December 2016 (after Trump had just been 
elected) Hofer received only 46% of the vote and Van der Bellen became president. Had Nobert Hofer 
won it would no doubt have shaken the EU and been considered a victory for populism. Never the 
less Norbert Hofer has recently (spring 2017) stated that he is now committed to the EU and that has 
                                                 
47 Reference: https://euobserver.com/opinion/136454 
48 It is thus telling that in Spain the radical party Podemos’ ratings went significantly down after Brexit while the pro-
European Mariano Rajoy gained momentum. At the moment and despite a still too high youth unemployment, the Spanish 
economy is one of the fastest-growing. 
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no intentions of either calling a referendum nor leaving the common currency were he at some point 
in the future to be elected President or joining government49.  
The next test of populism and anti-European sentiments was the election in The Netherlands in March 
2017. Here a lot of international media hype predicted a great victory in terms of votes for the anti- 
immigration and anti-Europe candidate Geert Wilders from the Freedom Party. He promised the 
Dutch voters that they would get an EU-referendum concerning their membership if he was voted 
into government. Prior to the Dutch election, polls indicated that there was a significant chance The 
Freedom Party could become the greatest party in the Dutch Parliament, but as no other parties wanted 
to form government with Wilders his possible success in terms of governmental posts was slim and 
never truly considered among national experts50. However, also here the predictions and polls were 
wrong - foreseeing a Wilders victory. Thus the incumbent, Prime minister Mark Rutte was re-elected 
as Prime Minister referring to himself as representing ‘good populism’ as opposed to the ‘bad’ version 
of Geert Wilders51. Much less noted in the international media was the fall of the socialist party in the 
Netherlands52 and the concurrent rise in several smaller but very pro-European parties with young 
party leaders. For instance Jesse Klaver from the Green Party and D66 which both experienced a leap 
in support for their green and pro-EU agenda. The election winners were also more moderate 
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) who acquired 19 seats (gaining 7). Democrats 66 got 19 (gaining 
6), and the Geen Links (Klavers party) landed at 14 (gaining 10). Both the D66 and GL are not only 
pro-European but also progressive on social themes53. 
While lots of experts had warned against a Wilders victory in The Netherlands an even more media 
hype was connected to the second round of the French election on May 7th 2017. This election 
demonstrated more than any of the others that we may indeed have been dealing – not with a domino 
– but a reserve -domino-effect in Europe after Brexit and Trump. The second round of the French 
election thus revealed that a large majority chose Europe alongside with the young Emmanuel 
Macron. 66% for Macron again the nationalist and anti-EU candidate Marine Le Pen who got 34 % 
of the vote54. Moreover, Macrons march to Europe’s anthem on election night in front of Louvre ‘said 
more than words’ according to several observers55. 
                                                 
49 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-austria-politics-fpo-idUSKBN17R232 
50 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/15/dutch-election-results-geert-wilders-andmark-rutte-vie-power/;  
51 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/19/dutch-election-rutte-wilders-good-populism-bad- 
52 The labour party PvDA was severely defeated as they lost 19.1% of their voters and are now down at 5.7 lossing 29 
seats.  
53 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/03/20/the-netherlands-complicated-election-result-explained/ 
54 https://www.ft.com 
55 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/08/macron-europe-president-nationalism 
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Hence the French people ended up neglecting Front Nationale and Le Pen’s promise of an EU-
referendum and a goodbye to the Eurozone. Instead they opted for more Europe and enforced 
cooperation in the Eurozone which are among Macrons big aspirations. The French election was 
special in the sense that Emmanuel Macron gained more support from the other candidates’ voters in 
the second round than Marine Le Pen. It seems as Le Pen was only able to mobilise some of the right 
wing voters from the republican Francois Fillon56. One of Le Pen most unpopular promises was in 
fact her wanting to skip the euro and go for an EU referendum. However, Le Pens own supporters 
feared for their own as well as for the French economy in case of an exit. Thus Le Pen voters as well 
as some of the right and left wing supporters from the established parties may not have endorsed 
Macrons very pro-EU program. But they clearly feared that less than a goodbye to the European 
Union57.   
The Austrian, Dutch and now French election have thus all worked against the theory of a domino-
effect following from Brexit – or perhaps even confirmed the anti-domino thesis suggested by Foreign 
Affairs. It is never the less interesting to note the great difference in voter-turnout in the three 
elections. Whereas the French at 66.6 was the lowest since 196958, the voter turnout in the Dutch was 
relatively high.  
What now awaits is the election to the National Assembly in France (still pending as these words are 
written), as well as the German general election.  
The German election in September 2017 is far from as exciting as the previous ones as we here have 
two pro-EU establishment candidates competing against each other, current chancellor Angela 
Merkel and her socialist contender Martin Schultz. Moreover, as Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 
once a rising factor in German politics has gone down at an all time low at 8% in the polls this suggests 
that populism and Brexit certainly will not emulate to Germany either. If we look at the elections in 
several European countries the case of Brexit and Trump may thus – quite paradoxically and against 
the expectations, trigger more – and not less – integration in the future. Without Great Britain as “the 
awkward partner” (George 1998) and with Macron in the Elyse and Merkel or Schultz in the Kansler 
Amt in Berlin, Europe may very likely experience a new momentum. The chaotic process of leaving 
                                                 
56 https://www.ft.com 
57 https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_upload/EZ_eupinions_2017_02_ENG.pdf 
This study by the Bertelsmann stiftung conducted on May 5th 2017 stresses that even the extreme right have a problem 
with their voters when being too anti-European. Norbert Hofer had exactly the same problem with his voters in the 
Austrian Presidential election which may be the reason that he has now retreated being anti-European. 
58 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/07/world/europe/france-election-results-maps.html?_r=0; 
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/08/europe/french-voters-spoiled-ballots-abstained/index.html; 
http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2968/; http://www.politico.eu/article/lesson-from-the-low-country-fear-is-
good-netherlands-election-result-mark-rutte-geert-wilders/ 
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the EU that Great Britain is going through at the moment certainly seems only to have strengthened 
this motion. A large poll by Bertelmanns Stiftung completed in the six largest member-states 
Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland show that the average support to the EU has 
gone from 57% before the British referendum to 62% after the referendum [1]. The polls show, that 
the support has risen in all of the six countries except Spain where it fell from 71% to 69%. Hence 
the support also rose in Great Britain. 
The driving force in the populism narrative that has been dominant through-out the European media 
is the polarised people. A survey by Bertelmann Stiftung looks at exactly these phenomena finding 
that 1 in 5 French consider themselves far-right or far-left. However, as the study also concludes, it is 
never the less a big mistake, to take the polarised population as per-se anti-European. One should thus 
be careful not always to interpret fear of globalisation as implying anti-Europeanism. Many in fact 
view the EU as the best protection against unconstraint market forces 59. That being said, the French 
with a more pessimistic worldview were more likely to vote Le Pen60. Therefore the vital battle for 
the future direction of the EU probably lies in whether or not it can facilitate and help improving the 
economic situation for that part of the population who fell they have not gained from either European 
integration in the past 10-15 years nor from globalisation as such. If jobs are not created it is certainly 
possible that the far-right populist narrative may facilitate more anti-EU mobilisation in the future.  
What concerns many Europeans at the moment is however exactly, but perhaps also paradoxically, 
the rise in (right wing) protest parties. In a future of Europe survey (Eurobarometer) an in-depth study 
asked the public about the central concerns EU face right now, and how they see the Union in the 
future.  
The survey concluded61: “[t]hat the majority of respondents see the rise of political parties protesting 
against the traditional political elites in various European countries is a matter of concern (59%), with 
21% totally agreeing with this statement. Overall, three in ten disagree with this statement (30%), 
with 9% saying they totally disagree. 11% do not know” (Eurobarometer, 2016: 83).  
                                                 
59 https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_upload/EZ_eupinions_2017_02_ENG.pdf 
60 https://www.ft.com 
61http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/surve
yKy/2131 
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The chart shows that there is generally a high concern about the rise of anti-establishment parties as 
AfD, Front Nationale and Geert Wilders' Freedom Party. Germany scores the highest on the chart 
when it comes to agreeing that the rise of anti-establishment parties is a matter of concern.  
The survey was undertaken soon after the UK voted to leave the EU. Here it was also found that ”The 
majority of respondents have a positive view of the European Union, and agree it embodies peace, 
social equality and solidarity, and tolerance and openness to others. Moreover, […]Most respondents 
support more European-level decision making in a range of key policy areas, including fighting 
terrorism, promoting democracy and peace, protecting the environment and dealing with migration 
issues. Since 2014, there have been large increases in the proportions who think there should be more 
EU level decision-making about health and social security issues and migration issues from outside 
the EU. Although most agree more decision making should take place at the EU level, respondents’ 
opinions are divided over a “two-speed Europe”.  
Finally, a large majority of respondents consider that the European Union project offers a future 
perspective for Europe’s youth.” 
Just to supplement the study about the anxiety concerning the rise of anti-establishment parties we 
have done a study of the number of right wing parties in selected EU countries. In particular Hungary 
and Poland give rise to concern:  
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Right- and far-right parties of selected EU countries62 
 
The graph illustrates the development in right-wing and far-right parties in Denmark, France, 
Netherlands, Poland, Germany and Hungary. In countries where there are more than one right- or far-
right party, the vote share is summarised. This is i.e. the case in Hungary where there have been four 
different parties, and where there were two in the latest election in 2014. The development in 
percentage of votes stems from national election results and in cases where there have been an upper 
and lower house of parliament the result is taken from the lower house. The French regional election 
from 2015 is included to show a more up to date picture. The vote share of Geert Wilders Freedom 
Party from the newly held election is also included63.  
The data is taken from an New York Times article which made an overview of the European right-
wing parties development using the European Election Database, Inter-Parliamentary Union and 
electionguide.org.  
While the graph above shows that the right-wing parties of Europe have largely remained in status-
quo concern for the rise of anti-European right-wing parties has actually increased, which suggests 
growing popular opposition toward political forces that advocate for populism and their states’ 
withdrawal from the EU. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/22/world/europe/europe-right-wing-austria-hungary.html?smid=fb-
nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=2 See alsoEuropean Election Database, Inter-Parliamentary Union, ElectionGuide.org 
63 The graph is updated after the French Presidential election.  
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6. Conclusions  
This chapter has examined and discussed whether Brexit will be emulated in other member states in 
the near future. The answer to this question has been a solid no: this is not very likely. In fact, to the 
contrary several things today suggest that because of Brexit and Trump Europeans are moving closer 
together. Not father apart. As it is obviously, impossible and risky to predict about the future the 
analysis here has been based on a critical examination of the projections made about populism as a 
general western phenomenon fostered by anti-establishment sentiments following from the Brexit 
referendum in June 2016 and the election of Trump in November 2016. It was then discussed how 
the special British relationship with Europe might tell us a something about how the UK is different 
in terms of wanting to risk its access to the world’s greatest market in a yes/no referendum. Finally, 
the chapter investigated the past 3 national/presidential elections in Europe to try to find evidence of 
a populist surge among Europeans and in fact found the opposite. This tendency was further 
confirmed by investigating recent opinion polls and surveys documenting that the rise in right wing 
populism in Europe has indeed been decreasing together with a stabilization in the support for right 
wing parties. It was also shown that the largest fear among Europeans today is in fact not globalisation 
or more power to Brussels but almost the contrary: a rise and increasing empowerment of right wing 
populism.    
The main finding when it comes to the British goodbye to the EU was its conception of sovereignty 
as a zero zum game. The obsession with ‘taking back control’ and retrieving some kind of formal 
sovereignty is to a large extend shared with in particular the Scandinavian countries who also have a 
majoritarian outlook and view European integration in a very formalist fashion. More Europe is in 
this light always conflated with less national sovereignty instead of for instance seeing a stronger EU 
as a precondition for the ability of individual nations to continue influencing the world.  Solving 
problems jointly with other nations should thus not – as the present author sees it – be equated with 
a loos of impact on one’s own future but as a unique opportunity to actually form one’s own destiny 
by influencing (rather than being influenced by) the European rules of the game. Whether other 
countries – i.e. the Scandinavians - in the future will follow in the UK’s footsteps is therefore hard to 
predict. However, a lot will probably depend on the deal that the UK manages to negotiate with 
Brussels. Denmark in particular has previously on many occasions used the UK as a negotiating shield 
and as a copycat for deals that Denmark wanted to obtain for itself. It is therefore also quite clear that 
should the brits get a deal that – when seen from an equally sovereignty obsessed nation’s perspective 
– is too tempting another referenda on Europe cannot be entirely excluded.  
